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Who Should Own the Property Rights?
Revisiting the Downstream Water Pollution Problem
Market Report
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One of the concerns in environmental and ecological
economics is the overexploitation of natural resources,
often leading to pollution. Proponents of market based
solutions to these pollution problems argue that one only
needs to move away from common property (the way
almost all natural resources, other than land, are owned
now), to individual property, i.e., privatize the natural
resource ownership, in this case create individual property
rights in the capacity of some body of water to process
water pollutants. These proponents also do not see (or
downplay) the usually significant transaction costs, instead
presuming that bargaining and other interactions between
individual property owners is essentially costless and
efficiency is easily achieved. In such a case, the role of
government would be limited to: 1) providing a way to
allocate the initial property rights, and 2) supporting the
legal system to enforce the property rights.
One of the key realities missed in this story is that
transaction costs are far from negligible, largely because
individuals have widely different views on the best level of
pollution. Such costs are also not easily reduced by
government intervention, as it is difficult to force any kind
of common ground among the affected parties. The
question is: In this situation, can we design policies that
lead to efficiency without a heavy handed influence of
government, or can we instead rely on individuals finding
this common ground through some kind of interaction?
To provide some insight into the effectiveness of
various kinds of interaction we conducted an experiment in
July of 2012, in which participants played the role of
Upstream Farmer (UF) or Downstream Water User (DWU).
Each UF was randomly paired with a DWU. Decisions by
the participants determined their financial gain in the game.
Average cash earnings were $45, with a range of $15 to $71
for a 60-90 minute long session. The experiment included
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various treatments, with one dimension being the
ownership of the property right, i.e., either the upstream
farmer or the downstream water user had the right to
determine the pollution level of the water resource. The
other dimension was the type of feedback that the affected
party was able to give to the party determining the
pollution. We focused on the observed difference in
behavior of participants based on who owns the property
right. (For a discussion on the effect of feedback see the
September 5, 2012 Cornhusker Economics Newsletter at
http://agecon.unl.edu/cornhuskereconomics.)
In the experiment, participants made a decision on
how much conservation technology the Upstream Farmer
was to use, and consequently, how much water pollution
to cause. The use of conservation technology to reduce the
pollution is more costly to the farmer; the property right
owner hence faces a trade-off between their own payoff
and the other person’s payoff. The figure below illustrates
the choices that were made concerning own payoff, based
on the respective treatment. Generally, the higher the own
payoff, the lower the other person’s payoff.
If the Upstream Farmer is a Property Rights Owner
(PRO), the choice is much more skewed towards self than
if the property rights owner is the Downstream Water
User. If the UF possess the property right, they take about
66 percent of the total payoff for themselves, while the
DWUs take just a little above 50 percent. This difference
is statistically significant for each of the three feedback
treatments.
There are two likely explanations for this outcome.
The first explanation is that individuals are used to farmers
making production decisions that may not always consider
costs imposed on downstream water users, i.e., the
accepted status quo has historically been to give the rights
to the upstream farmer. Hence, Downstream Water Users
are willing to allow somewhat larger payoffs to the
Upstream Farmer than in
the reverse scenario. The
other explanation is that
DWUs are more attuned
to what it means to suffer
the consequences of
someone else’s decisions,
and hence are more
willing to walk-in-theirshoes and sacrifice a bit
more.

The implication of this result is that if society prefers a
more easily achieved efficient level of pollution without the
need to heavily intervene, accomplished by individuals
tempering their choices by each considering the situation of
others, property rights should be given to the party affected
negatively by increased pollution. Intriguingly, the experiment shows that the degree of pollution of the natural
resource is independent of who owns the property right –
hence there is no efficiency loss from using this approach.
(This research was funded by USDA grant # 2012-70002-19387.
Special thanks to the University of Nebraska-Lincoln students
Shannon Moncure and Stephanie Kennedy; and the University of
Michigan-Dearborn student Jonathan Gonzalez for their
assistance in administering the experiment.)
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